Remarks From Peter Doody to the AGM of Professional Engineers Ontario

The following are speaking notes for an address to the AGM of Professional Engineers of Ontario on April 25, 2015. Engineers Canada is posting them on our website with the permission of the author, Peter K. Doody.

April 25, 2015

Before I begin, I need to point out that these remarks are my own, and not Commissioner Paul Bélanger’s. The Commission of Inquiry came to an end on October 15, 2014 when the report was delivered. The facts I will outline are those found by Commissioner Bélanger but the comments are mine alone.

On June 23, 2012, the roof of the Algo Mall in Elliot Lake collapsed and fell into the food court and through two stories, crushing and killing two persons. It was a sunny Saturday afternoon, and most of the people who would have been in the mall on a rainy day were outside enjoying the weather. But for that, the number of victims would have been much greater. As Commissioner Paul Bélanger found, the building failure was caused by human failure. He wrote:

Although it was rust that defeated the structure of the Algo Mall, the real story behind the collapse is one of human, not material, failure. Many of those whose calling or occupation touched the Mall displayed failings – its designers and builders, its owners, some architects and engineers, as well as the municipal and provincial officials charged with the duty of protecting the public. Some of these failings were minor; some were not. They ranged from apathy, neglect, and indifference through mediocrity, ineptitude, and incompetence to outright greed, obfuscation, and duplicity. Occasional voices of alarm blew by deaf and callous ears. Warning signs went unseen by eyes likely averted for fear of jeopardizing the continuing existence of the Mall - the social and economic hub in Elliot Lake.

Some engineers forgot the moral and ethical foundation of their vocation and profession – to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public. They occasionally pandered more to their clients’ sensitivities than to their professional obligation to expose the logical and scientific consequences of their observations. Some of their inspections were so cursory and incomplete as to be essentially meaningless. Others were fundamentally flawed because they were based on false assumptions or calculations.

Of course, the Commissioner’s criticisms did not all apply to every engineer who came into contact with the mall over its 33 years of existence. Nor do they apply to the vast majority of professional engineers who practice their profession in this province. But tragedies such as the mall collapse are opportunities to discover gaps in the systems that we rely on to ensure that our modern infrastructure works – that, in this case, our buildings stand and do not collapse. The Commission uncovered not only human failings, but gaps in our systems that allowed those failings to flourish. Those gaps can be bridged, and future tragedies averted, if the Commissioner’s recommendations are implemented.

How did it happen?

The parking deck was on the roof of the mall. It consisted of 4 foot by 30 foot preformed prestressed concrete slabs, resting on steel I-beams. The horizontal I-beams were attached to columns by welds. The slabs were covered by a thin concrete topping. There was no impermeable membrane covering the entire surface. Instead, the concrete topping was intentionally cracked at some longitudinal joints and some butt joints between the slabs, with elastomeric material deployed under the cracks, with the intention of avoiding any other cracks and preventing water that leaked through the intentional cracks from getting through the roof deck. The roof deck was constructed in three discrete sections with expansion joints separating the sections.

The system was a dismal failure from the moment it was installed.

The parking deck leaked from the outset and throughout the entire life of the Mall.

Post-construction efforts to remedy the situation were futile. They typically consisted of grinding out cracks, and inserting elastomeric compound in the crack. The expansion joints were replaced a number of times.

Water penetrated the concrete topping through the cracks, both intended and unintended. Some bonding between the topping and the slabs failed, allowing water to migrate laterally along the slab surfaces and along steel beams. Sealants failed, sealing methods were questionable, expansion joints allowed water penetration, and drainage was deficient. For 33 years water laden with chlorides percolated down to the steel beams and their connections. This led, in the opinion of independent forensic engineers retained by the Crown, to ‘corrosion rates at levels only found in marine environments.”  Those engineers conducted visual inspections on 45 locations throughout the mall, and detailed assessments on 20 of those. Welds and other components of the connections in more than 40 per cent of the locations inspected had severe to very severe corrosion – loss of section of more than 10 per cent.

Ultimately, a weld which connected a beam to a column corroded through and failed. The engineers calculated that at the time of the collapse, that connection would have held only 50 per cent of its design weight. No weld metal was left between the angle and the column flange – they were separated. The corrosion had progressed to a state where it had eaten away the entire weld.

Bad choices made by the original owners, motivated by cost-cutting considerations, led largely to this chronic and dangerous situation.

What role was played by engineers?

• The mall was visited, examined, evaluated, and reported on by engineers and architects some 30 times.
• The engineers’ recommendations relating to structural integrity and impermeability were never implemented.
• Many inspections were constrained by the narrowness of their mandate.
• Some were sophisticated and relatively thorough; others were cursory and seriously deficient.
• No serious and comprehensive survey, inspection, and analysis of the steel substructure of the parking deck was ever commissioned and undertaken.
• In all the reports, there was never an attempt to foresee or predict the consequences if the recommendations of the professionals were not followed.
• There was never an explicit warning about the consequences to the steel substructure if corrective measures were not adopted.
• Little explicit attention was paid to connections between beams and columns.
• Some professionals recommended continuing the patch and seal method of waterproofing, despite it being obvious that it did not work.
• Some professionals were reluctant to review previous reports.
• One report was amended to accommodate owner’s desire to subdue criticism and to make the report more palatable.
• Many inspections were strictly visual, and superficial, with no attempt at quantitative testing or even minimal removal or displacement of obstructing material.
• One report suggested that an unsatisfactory remedial procedure was an “option” – suggesting that it might be viable when it was not.
• Another report was not explicit in making clear that the recommended remedial procedure required professional supervision and implementation by experienced and qualified contractors; even then, primarily for financial reasons, a variant of the ineffective patch and seal method of waterproofing was recommended, though the alternative but costlier option was clearly superior.
• Inspections were occasionally conducted without interviewing affected occupants of the mall or determining the history of leakage.
• Engineers were confused about the carrying capacity of the deck, but they made only half-hearted efforts to discover it rather than careful consultation with other professionals or the literature or on-site examinations and analysis. This led to indecision and dithering on the part of owners and provided some of them with excuses for inaction.
• Some engineers were not careful in describing precisely the limits of their experience, expertise, and qualifications.
• Some opinions about the structural condition of the Mall were expressed without the involvement of a structural engineer.

The commissioner identified problems with the existing system of protection for structural integrity of buildings in Ontario

• While all buildings must be constructed in compliance with the Building Code and be inspected before occupancy to ensure compliance with code, the same is not true of existing buildings – after occupancy, there is no standard compulsory regulation or inspection.
• There is no requirement that all existing buildings in Ontario meet any minimum structural maintenance standards.
• There is no requirement that there be any inspections of existing buildings in Ontario.
• There are no performance standards setting out what must be done when an existing building is being inspected to determine if it is structurally sound.
• There is no limitation on the area of practice in which a professional engineer can be engaged – all can carry out structural engineering mandates.
• There are no standards about what information should be contained in a report provided to an owner after an inspection to determine structural soundness.
• There is no requirement that a structural engineering report that has concluded that a building is unsafe be provided to a public official.
• There is no way for a member of the public to determine whether an inspection has determined that a building to which the public has access is structurally safe.
• There is no way for a purchaser of a building, or an engineer conducting an inspection, to be sure that he or she has been given all prior structural engineering reports.
• There is no ability for a public official to order that maintenance or repairs be performed to prevent a building becoming unsafe – they can only issue order after it has become unsafe.
• There is no requirement that a public official, such as a building inspector, do anything at all if he or she becomes aware that a building is unsafe.
• There is no simple and quick way for a member of the public to determine if an official has issued an order requiring that a building be repaired.
• There is no clear prohibition on the altering of a draft engineering report simply because a client asks that it be altered.
• There is no mandatory continuing education for engineers.

The commission engaged in roundtable discussions about potential policy recommendations over three days, with representatives from a number of interested parties, including the PEO.

Recommendations of the Commissioner

Minimum Structural Maintenance Standards for Buildings

• There should be province-wide minimum structural maintenance standards for all buildings in Ontario.
• They should include a requirement that all buildings be watertight, structurally sound, and not unsafe, and be maintained in such a way as to keep them in that condition for a reasonable period

Mandatory Inspections

• All owners of buildings should be required to ensure that their buildings are inspected periodically by a professional engineer to determine whether they comply with the Minimum Standard and what steps, if any, need to be taken to bring them into compliance
• the PEO should enact a Performance Standard for the prescribed structural inspection
• The PEO should enact a program certifying structural engineering specialists, who would be the only professional engineers entitled to carry out the inspection

Reports of inspections

• After conducting a structural inspection, the structural engineering specialist should complete a Structural Adequacy Report to determine whether the building meets the Minimum Structural Maintenance Standard and, if it does not, to describe what repairs and maintenance are required in order for the building to meet that standard.
• The report should be provided to the owner of the building.
• If the structural engineer concludes that the condition of the building does not meet the minimum standard, he or she should be required to provide a copy of the report, which must set out the repairs or maintenance required to rectify the situation, to the municipality’s chief building official.
• The province should create a public accessible registry, to be called the Structural Condition Registry, to operate like the Brownfields Registry.
• All Structural Adequacy Reports should be filed on the registry, so any member of the public can know whether a building they enter has been inspected and determined to be safe

Enforcing the Minimum Structural Maintenance Standard

• The chief building official of each municipality (who has received any structural adequacy report that shows problems) should have the authority to issue an order requiring repairs to a building that does not meet the minimum standard.
• After receiving a report that describes breaches of the minimum standard, the chief building official should be required to determine whether to

(a) issue an order requiring repair of the building;
(b) order that the building be closed; or
(c) make no order.

• The decision should be in writing and registered on the registry.

Frequency of Inspection

• All buildings to which the public has access should be inspected whenever:

(a) a building is sold;
(b) when the chief building official orders it;
(c) when repairs ordered to comply with minimum standards are completed; and in any event
(d) no later than after a minimum time recommended by a panel of experts.

Sharing of Reports re structural capacity, watertightness, and public safety of buildings

• Owners of a building should share such professional reports and give them to a purchaser, anyone conducting an inspection, assessment, repair or renovation of the building, or the municipality when a building permit is applied for.
• Professional engineers and architects should be required to make available any records in their possession or control in respect of the structural integrity of a building to any professional engineer or architect doing inspection or assessment for the owner; a prospective purchaser or someone doing an inspection for him or her; or the chief building official or inspector under OHSA.

Regulation of engineering profession

• There should be clear direction from the PEO that the contents of an engineering report or draft report should not be altered simply because client requests that it be changed
• Mandatory continuing education for all professional engineers should be implemented as soon as possible

The PEO made a significant contribution to the Elliot Lake Inquiry. It issued a Practice Bulletin in November 2012 – 4 months before the hearings even began - which went a long way towards dealing with some of the more significant issues. That Practice Bulletin suggested many things that the Commissioner later recommended be made mandatory by being included in a Performance Standard.

The PEO was granted standing in Part 1, which dealt with the causes of the collapse. The PEO made written submissions, which were to a great extent adopted by Commissioner Belanger.

The PEO took part in the roundtable discussions, and agreed with the suggestions that later became recommendations.

But little progress has been made.

Now, it is almost three years after the collapse, 2 ½ years after the Practice Bulletin, 1 ½ years after the policy round tables, and six months after the report was released. But:

• the Practice Bulletin is not yet a Performance Standard;
• there are no legally enforceable requirements of what must be done when carrying out a structural adequacy inspection;
• there are no legal requirements for the contents of a structural adequacy report;
• there is no certified specialist program, so any professional engineer can provide an opinion with respect to structural integrity of a building to which the public has access;
• there is no CPD requirement for professional engineers in Ontario, so engineers are not required to certify that they are taking steps to stay current with new developments; and
• there is no clear direction that engineers should not alter a draft report simply because a client asks them to do so.

I urge the PEO to take the steps necessary to fix these things. I learned today that the newly adopted strategic plan includes an objective that the inquiry recommendations be implemented. That objective should be given a high priority.

There are many things left undone that are beyond PEO’s control because they require action by the Province, but in which you could help:

• there are still no province wide minimum maintenance standards;
• there are still no requirements to ever inspect buildings after they are occupied;
• there is still no ability to order work be done to prevent future structural safety issues;
• there is still no way for a member of the public to learn whether a building to which she has access is safe; and
• there is still no way to ensure that engineers conducting structural inspections can be assured that they have all the relevant reports and documents.

Members of many professions have obligations to the public which, like their obligations to their clients, must be honoured. Lawyers cannot allow perjured evidence to be presented. Accountants must follow professional standards in the preparation of financial statements so that those who read them can be assured that they can rely on their contents in their financial decisions. Few professionals, however, can say that their obligations to the public are as great as professional engineers whose decisions and opinions can literally ensure or endanger the lives and safety of members of the public. The members of your profession honour that obligation. You do so individually by ensuring that each of you exercises the highest standards in your professional work. You do so collectively, through the PEO, by setting standards and by ensuring that your fellow engineers abide by those standards.

Members of the public have the right to expect that when they enter a building, they can be sure that it was not only built safely and soundly but maintained so that it is still safe and sound. Their lives depend on that. This organization can help to satisfy that expectation. I urge you to take all necessary steps to carry through on your commitments made to the public and to the Inquiry, and put into place those aspects of the Inquiry’s recommendations that are within your power. And please go further. Lobby the provincial government to put in place the other recommendations. Peoples’ lives may depend on it.

Peter K. Doody
Borden Ladner Gervais LLP
pdoody@blg.com